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ABSTRACT 
Empirical studies of the effect of futures markets on the 
volatility of the related spot markets have yielded 
conflicting results. Some studies have found that futures 
tradi~g increases the volatility of the underlying assets and 
thus has a destabilising effect. Other research has found 
that futures trading reduces volatility. There are 
theoretical arguments to support both opposing views on the 
impact of futuFes trading on the volatility of the underlying 
assets. As vo-latility is_· used as a risk measure, it affects 
the value of investments. 
It has been found "that liquidity has a highly significant 
effect on share returns. Higher levels of liquidity mean 
that assets are more tradable. Investors are willing to pay 
premium forth~ ability ,to dispose of their investments at a 
high price and within a short period of time. 
Both volatility and liquidity thus have an impact on the 
value of investments. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate what eff~ct index futures trading has had on the 
liquidity and volatility of the underlying asset market on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
This study covers the period from 1990 to 1997 and 
investigates the relationship between the volume and value of 
index futures trading for the three main share indices and 
the volatility of the underlying assets on the JSE. 
The results of the regression tests indicate significant 
positive relationships between futures trading activity and 
the volatility of the underlying assets for the All Gold 
Index and the Industrial Index. This suggests that increased 
futures trading is associated with increased volatility in 
the underlying assets. The relationships were not 
significant for the All Share Index. The results support the 
hypothesis that index futures trading increases the 
volatility of the underlying assets. 
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Regressi~ tests were performed using the volume of trade in 
the constituents of the indices as a measure of the- liquidity 
of the underlying assets. The results indisate signi~icant 
. . 
relationships with both the volume and val~ of related 
futures trading for all three indices. There are thus 
significant positive relationship between the level of 
futures trading activity and the liquidity of the cash 
market. 
Using the liquidity ratio as a measure of the liquidity of 
the underlying assets did not result in any significant · 
relationships between the liquidity of the underlying assets 
and the level of futures trading. 
These conflicting results highlight the problem associated 
with the measurement of liquidity. An increase in volume, 
all else being equal, does however improve the tractability 
and thus the liquidity of an asset. The results therefore 
support the hypothesis that index futures trading is 
associated with greater liquidity in the underlying assets. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
1.1 Introduction 
In an article entitled "Calming the market" in the Washington 
Post of 25 July, 1988, Shad, a former chairperson of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States, 
writes that "While stock index futures serve valid arbitrage 
and hedging purposes, they have escalated the leverage and 
volatility of the entire stock market to unacceptable levels" 
(Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992). In another article, "Raise 
futures and options margins now" in the Wall Street Journal 
of 15 January 1991, Shad writes that the "multi-billions of 
dollars of transactions" on the derivative markets have 
"escalated the leverage and volatility of the markets to 
precipitqus unacceptable levels" (Vanden Baviere and De 
Villiers, 1997). 
Amid speculation of a repeat of the 17 October 1987 crash, an 
article entitled "JSE's volatility on the rise" appeared in 
the Cape Times Business Report of 9 October 1997. It quotes 
a local securities dealer who argues that "The volatility had 
a lot to do with the futures close out, particularly when _it 
peaked _in August. There was a lot of futures trading, and 
the big shares were being sold before the close-out.- it was 
basically futures-manipulated" . 
The strong opinions reflected in these opening paragraphs 
have been subjected to empirical analysis. Empirical studies 
of the effect of futures markets on the volatility of the 
related spot markets have, however, yielded conflicting 
results (Figlewski, 1981; Edwards, Harris, 1989). 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) found that liquidity has a highly 
significant effect on share returns. The subject has 
received far less attention than volatility in the 
literature. Grossman (1988b) proposes that market makers in 
futures markets combine with market makers in the spot market 
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to enhance the overall liquidity of the equity market. 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) support Grossman's (1988a) 
theory of increased market liquidity as a result of futures 
trading. 
The problem addressed in this paper is what impact share 
index futures trading has had on the volatility and the 
liquidity of the underlying assets on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). 
1.2 The South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) 
The first commodity futures trading started in South Africa 
in 1973 with the futures broking house called Holcom Futures 
(Levett, 1991). It took another thirteen years before 
another one was established. 
2 
The introduction of share index futures led to an increase in 
futures trading in South Africa. Trading in the three share 
index futures commenced on an over-the-counter basis in March 
and April of 1987. Futures trading on the All-Share, All 
Gold and Industrial indices of the JSE was started by Rand 
Merchant Bank. Other market makers like Cape Investment Bank 
and National Discount house joined Rand Merchant Bank and in 
1988 they founded the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX, 
1997) . 
The average daily turnover has increased from 2 000 contracts 
in 1990 to more than 40 000 contracts. The products include 
share index futures, bond and interest rate futures and 
~ommodity futures. There are four share index futures, the 
All Share (INDI40), All Gold (GLDI10), Industrial (INDI25) 
and the Financial and Industrial (FNDI30). 
The major portion of the volume is in the JSE ALSI40, INDI25 
and GLDI10 contracts (SAFEX, 1997). The details of the three 
major contracts are shown in the table on the following page. 
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Details of share index futures from the SAFEX web page: 
Futures All Share All Gold Index Industrial 
Contract Index Index 
Code ALSI GLDI INDI 
Underlying JSE Actuaries JSE Actuaries JSE Actuaries 
Instrument Top 40 Top 10 Top 25 
Companies All Companies Gold Companies 
Share Index Index Industrial 
Index 
Contract Size RlO X Index RlO x Index RlO X Index 
Level Level Level 
Expiry Dates & 12h00 on 3ra 12h00 on 3ra 12h00 on 3ra 
times Friday of Mar, Friday of Mar, Friday of Mar, 
Jun, Sep & Dec Jun, Sep & Dec Jun, Sep & Dec 
(or previous (or previous (or previous 
business day) business day) business day) 
Quotations Index level Index level Index level 
(no decimal (no decimal (no decimal 
points) points) points) 
Minimum Price One index One index One index 
Movement point (RlO) point (RlO) point (RlO) 
Initial Margin Approximately Approximately Approximately 
R3,500 R3,500 R3,500 
(revised (revised (revised 
periodically periodically periodically 
by Risk by Risk by Risk 
Committee) Committee) Committee) 
Reduced margin Reduced margin Reduced margin 
for spread for spread for spread 
positions positions positions 
Expiry Arithmetic Arithmetic Arithmetic 
valuation average of average of average of 
method index taken index taken index taken 
every two every two every two 
minutes, over minutes, over minutes, over 
the final two the final two the final two 
hours of hours of hours of 
trading on trading on trading on 
expiry date, expiry date, expiry date, 
as calculated as calculated as calculated 
by the JSE by the JSE by the JSE 
Settlement Cash Settled Cash Settled Cash Settled 
Method 
Clearing House R1.70 per R1.70 per R1.70 per 
fees contract contract contract 
Options R0.70 Options RO. 70 Options R0.70 
per contract per contract per contract 
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1.3 Objective of the study 
The purpose of the study is to investigate what effect index 
futures trading has had on the liquidity and volatility of 
the underlying asset market on the JSE. 
1.4 The assumptions 
The behaviour of the index levels of the ALSI, ALSI40, INDI, 
INDI25, GLDI and GLDI10 on the SAFEX is assumed to be 
representative of the behaviour of the prices of the 
underlying assets of the entire JSE, the industrial sector 
and the gold sector. 
The behaviour of the aggregate trading volumes of the 
constituents of the ALSI40, GLDI10 and INDI25 is assumed to 
be representative of the behaviour of the trading volumes of 
the entire exchange, the gold sector and the industrial 
sector. 
1 . 5 The delimitations of the study 
The study deals only with the relationship between the SAFEX 
and the JSE. It also deals only with share index futures 
trading and not with the other financial and commodity 
futures traded on the SAFEX. 
The study investigates the All Share Index futures, the All 
Gold Index futures and the Industrial Index futures as this 
is where the majority of the trading activity has occurred 
(SAFEX, 1997). It does not deal with the Financial and 
Industrial Index futures. 
4 
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1.6 The organisation of the remainder of the study 
Chapter Two contains a review of the related literature on 
the nature of volatility, the nature of liquidity, the 
theories of the impact of index futures trading and the 
results of the related empirical research. Chapter Three 
contains the research method and Chapter Four describes the 
data used in the study. Chapter Five details the results of 
the empirical research, and the conclusions are contained in 
Chapter Six. 
5 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Volatility and liquidity are closely related and much of the 
literature deals with both together. The review has been 
divided loosely into the following headings which cover the 
major issues highlighted by the literature: 
2.2 The nature of volatility 
2.3 A theoretical perspective of the impact of futures 
trading on the volatility of the underlying assets 
2.4 Empirical research: The impact of futures trading on the 
volatility of the underlying assets 
2.5 The nature of liquidity 
2.6 A theoretical perspective of the impact of futures 
trading on the liquidity of the underlying assets 
2.2 The nature of volatility 
6 
The following papers discuss the nature and some of the 
causes of volatility. They form the basis for the discussion 
of the impact of futures trading on the volatility of the 
underlying assets. 
Karpoff (1987) reviews research on the relationship between 
trading volumes and price changes in financial markets. He 
regards the price-volume relationship as having significant 
implications for research into futures markets. 
~arpoff states that price variability affects the volume of 
trade in futures contracts. This is relevant to the issue of 
whether speculation has a stabilising or destabilising effect 
on futures prices. The time to delivery of a futures 
contract affects the volume of trading, and through this 
effect, possibly also the variability of the price of the 
contract. 
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7 
He finds that volume is positively related to the magnitude 
of price changes. In equity markets there is also a positive 
relationship between volume and the prices of equities. This 
supports some of the findings in the papers on liquidity. 
Schwert (1989) extends the scope of Karpoff and investigates 
other factors related to volatility. He finds that changes 
in the level of market volatility can have important effects 
on capital investment, consumption and other business cycle 
variables. 
He finds weak evidence that macro-economic volatility can 
help to predict share and bond return volatility. The 
evidence is stronger that financial asset volatility helps to 
predict future macro-economic volatility. He does not find 
this surprising as the prices of speculative assets should 
react qqickly to new information about economic events. 
Financial leverage affects share price volatility. When 
share prices fall relative to bond prices, or when firms 
issue new debt securities in a larger proportion to new 
equity than in their prior capital structure, share 
volatility increases. However, this effect explains only a 
small proportion of the changes in share price volatility 
over time. 
He finds what seems to be a relationship between trading 
activity and share volatility. The number of trading days in 
the month is positively related to the share price 
volatility. Also, share trading volume growth is positively 
related to share volatility. 
Schwert thus finds a number of factors which are related to 
volatility. None of the factors however play a dominant role 
in explaining the behaviour of share price volatility over 
time. 
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Volatility tests have been viewed as tests of market 
efficiency (Cochrane, 1991). Ackert and Smith (1993) 
investigate discrepancies between earlier studies of share 
price volatility and the efficient markets model. Variance-
bound tests are conducted in an attempt to explain share 
price volatility as being caused by variations in expected 
cash dividend returns. 
8 
Ackert and- Smith show that volatility, as a measure of market 
efficiency, using the variance-bound tests, depends on the 
definition of dividends. Using the narrow definition of cash 
dividend returns, they reject the efficient markets model. 
They re-perform their tests on the basis that share prices 
should reflect the discounted value of all anticipated future 
cash flows. These include cash distributions resulting from 
share re-purchases and take-overs. 
They find that investors receive their returns from a steady 
stream of cash dividends and a more volatile stream of other 
inflows. The volatility of the share prices are not too high 
to be explained by the discounted values of the total cash 
flows. The share prices are thus found to be set by rational 
investors as the present values of all anticipated future 
cash flows, and the efficient markets model cannot be 
rejected. 
Negative attitudes towards volatility have resulted in 
regulatory controls in an attempt to reduce volatility. 
Subrahmanyam (1994) investigates the introduction of "circuit 
breakers" by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Trading 
halts were imposed for a certain period of time if the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average moved by more than a certain amount 
over the previous day's close. The study addresses the 
effect of trading halts on the ex ante trading decisions of 
market participants and thus on the market liquidity and 
price variability. 
The paper shows that circuit breakers can, by encouraging 
traders to make sub-optimal advance trades in time, increase 
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price variability and exacerbate price movements. Where 
traders move from a primary market to satellite market, price 
variability and market liquidity decline in the primary 
market and increase in the satellite market. Lee, Ready and 
Seguin (1994) also found that trading halts increase rather 
than reduce both volume and volatility. 
9 
These studies add weight to the efficient markets hypothesis. 
The volatility of share prices is found to be a rational 
response to information available to investors. Attempts to 
reduce volatility by imposing trading halts lead to reduced 
efficiency in the market and to even higher levels of 
volatility. Volatility is found to be related to a number of 
different factors and no individual factor was found to 
dominate the explanatory power of the level of volatility. 
2.3 A theoretical perspective of the impact of futures 
trading on the volatility of the underlying assets 
The effect of futures trading on commodity prices has been a 
controversial subject for a long time (Cox, 1976). For about 
eighty years many farmers, regulators and economists have 
claimed that futures trading destabilises the spot prices and 
causes losses for consumers and producers (Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott, 1984). This led to regulation in the United 
States of the futures markets. The trade in onion futures 
was prohibited in 1958 and futures trading in all other 
commodities was regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (Cox, 1976) . 
According to Cox, the congressional hearings on the 
regulation of the futures markets showed that the regulators 
had neither a theory nor empirical evidence to support their 
theory of destabilisation caused by futures trading. He 
finds that several studies have yielded conflicting results 
with some finding no effect and others finding both increases 
and decreases in volatility as a result of futures trading. 
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10 
Danthine (1978) supports a multi-role theory of futures 
markets. Futures prices have an informative role where they 
are used as statistics by rational traders who use them in 
formulating their probability distributions. Danthine argues 
that together with the role of futures prices on commodity 
supply decisions, this informative view of futures trading 
implies a stabilising influence of speculation on spot 
prices. 
The futures markets are also a place where hedgers compensate 
speculators for sharing risks inherent to their productive 
activity. The asymmetry between traders, some of whom have 
real commitments and others who do not, reveals the futures 
price as a biased estimate of the spot price which, in its 
own right, can generate speculative trading. 
Figlewski's paper (1981) on futures trading and volatility in 
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) was 
written as futures markets were expanding from commodities to 
financial futures in the United States. He notes that the 
introduction of exchange traded futures contracts for 
treasury bills, GNMA pass-through certificates and other 
securities created new hedging, arbitrage and speculative 
opportunities for investors. He holds that futures trading 
opened these markets to new types of traders such as the 
private and smaller institutions. 
Figlewski argues that through the process of arbitrage, a 
financial futures market will be closely related to the 
underlying spot market. He points out several ways in which 
futures trading could increase efficiency and smooth price 
~ 
variations in the cash market: 
The most important role of futures markets is to provide 
traders in the underlying assets with a hedging mechanism to 
protect themselves against unfavourable price changes. 
Futures markets help to spread risk and transfer it from 
hedgers of spot positions to speculators who have higher risk 
profiles. He argues that the risk transfer may improve the 
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functioning of the spot market by reducing the need to 
incorporate a risk premium for price fluctuations into the 
cash prices of the underlying assets. 
11 
The introduction of futures trading may also increase the 
informational efficiency of the cash market. Futures markets 
are expected to be informationally efficient and incorporate 
the best estimates of future prices. Through the arbitrage 
process, this information will impact on the prices in the 
underlying assets. The magnitude of these effects will 
depend on the nature of the underlying asset market. A 
highly efficient cash market will clearly not be as affected 
by greater informational efficiency in the futures market as 
would an inefficient market. 
Figlewski also states that it is possible that in some cases 
futures trading could increase cash price variability. When 
futures prices are distorted by technical factors or 
manipulation, then mis-pricing could spread to the cash 
market. He believes that these problems could be solved 
effectively by introducing suitable regulation. 
Futures markets may also lead to a significant volume of 
hedge trading without sufficient speculative trade to allow 
for effective risk transfer. This could result in the 
dealers and market makers having to bear risk transferred 
through both the cash and the futures markets. 
If the investors in the cash market have better information 
than those in the futures market, then their trading could 
drive the cash prices away from their most appropriate 
values. This will induce trading by the better informed cash 
market traders to stabilise the futures prices and will lead 
to more volatility in the cash prices. 
Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984) discuss the popular view 
that the futures market is only a socially acceptable form of 
gambling. This view holds that because futures markets are 
speculative, spot markets are more volatile with futures 
---------------------
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12 
markets than without them. The theory predicts that futures 
markets lead to inefficiencies in the underlying asset 
markets by causing sub-optimal allocations of resources. 
They present the other side of the argument that futures 
markets publicise private information held in an economy. 
This allows the markets to reach equilibrium more easily and 
the resulting allocation of resources will be more efficient 
than if there was no futures trading. 
The crash of October 1987 led to an increased interest in the 
volatility of the markets (Grossman, 1988b; Edwards 1988; 
Tosini, 1988; Hill and Jones, 1988). The public, still 
reeling under the shock of the crash was clearly demanding 
explanations. 
Edwards (1988) argues that whenever high market volatility 
occurs, there is a tendency to blame it on any new 
innovations at the time. It is not therefore unexpected that 
index futures have been accused of increasing the volatility 
of cash prices. He acknowledges that expiration day 
volatility does occur when traders, who hold cash positions 
related to futures positions, unwind their positions at the 
end of the futures or option contracts. When the trades at 
the expiration dates occur mainly on one side of the market, 
they lead to an order imbalance in the cash market. If the 
specialists who handle the underlying shares cannot provide 
sufficient liquidity, then sharp upward or downward price 
movements will occur. On non-expiration days, portfolio 
insurance trading, in combination with programme trading, may 
cause unusual share price volatility. 
Edwards addresses the question of why increased volatility 
should matter. It has been argued that higher volatility 
raises the risk premium demanded by investors, thereby 
raising real interest rates and the cost of capital. He 
believes that the theory and evidence to support this 
argument are questionable and that its social welfare 
implications are unclear. 
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13 
He presents a simpler explanation for the concern over 
volatility. Investors are concerned about the present and 
future values of their investments and higher volatility 
leads to a perception of greater risk which affects the value 
of the investments. When there are large falls in the 
market, investors see the value of their assets decline. The 
fact that this is merely a redistribution of wealth with no 
social cost to the price change does not soften the effect. 
When asset prices show significant volatility over very short 
periods, investors begin to lose confidence in the market. 
They begin to see the market as a place for speculators and 
insiders and not for rational long-term investors. If this 
becomes a universal view then these investors will reduce 
their investment in the market. 
Edwards finds it difficult to justify the public perception 
that increases in volatility are bad by linking volatility to 
economic welfare or economic activity. An increase in 
volatility may be a result of a change in economic factors, 
new information about them, or market expectations of changes 
in them . There is then no clear social cost to such 
volatility and it may even increase the efficient allocation 
of resources by enabling prices to reflect new information 
more quickly and accurately. 
If volatility is lesser or greater than the level resulting 
from fundamental economic indicators, then the result will be 
mispricing and therefore a misallocation of resources. The 
volatility resulting from index futures trading should 
therefore only be criticised for causing excessive or 
deficient volatility. The social costs of short term excess 
volatility are likely to be minimal. The important issue is 
then whether index futures trading causes long-run excess 
volatility. 
Edwards suggests that futures trading should bring more 
traders to the cash market, making the cash markets more 
liquid and therefore less volatile. 
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14 
The belief, that share index futures trading increases 
volatility in the underlying markets, arises from the view 
that the establishment of futures markets attracts uninformed 
and irrational speculators who then trade in the futures and 
spot markets. Economists have concluded that it would take a 
considerable number of speculators to destabilise the spot 
markets. Nevertheless, the perception persists that futures 
prices are more volatile than spot prices and that this 
volatility is transmitted to the underlying assets by 
arbitrageurs (Edwards, 1988). 
Share price volatility continued to receive much attention in 
the press after the 1987 crash (Harris, 1989) . Many argued 
that the start of trade in index futures and index options 
increased speculative activity and that this destabilised the 
cash markets, leading to higher volatility. Harris agrees 
that the large volume of trading activity made the 
accusations seem plausible. 
Grossman (1988a) discusses the effect of index arbitrage, 
using index futures, on the volatility of the underlying 
assets. He regards index arbitrageurs as messengers who take 
orders from the futures market and bring them to the stock 
market. Grossman presents his argument with the aid of a 
scenario in which there is a desire by institutions to sell 
shares in a company at a certain price. If there were no 
futures market, or index arbitrageurs, then institutions 
would sell the shares directly on the stock market, instead 
of trying to eliminate the downside risk by selling the 
shares on the futures market. The immediate selling pressure 
would have to be borne totally by the stock exchange market 
makers. 
The market makers on the futures market and the stock market 
combine to increase the overall liquidity of the equity 
market. The index arbitrageurs take positions that help to 
unify the two markets. 
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According to Grossman, the portfolio insurance strategies 
used by institutions will increase share price volatility to 
some extent, even if there were no futures markets. Futures 
trading, however, facilitates l~w transaction cost trades in 
packages of shares. This allows institutions to trade more 
gradually than if there were no futures market. Larger 
transaction costs will encourage fewer but larger individual 
trades. Futures markets therefore cushion the effects of 
portfolio insurance by lowering transaction costs. 
Hill and Jones (1988) hold that portfolio insurance in its 
most common form is implemented with index futures. It will 
have a cost that depends on the assumed volatility over the 
time horizon. Its realised cost will depend on the actual 
volatility over the period that the programme is in place. 
Portfolio insurance programmes are implemented via dynamic 
hedging trade, in shares or share index futures, in varying 
amounts, in an attempt to duplicate the gains and losses that 
would have been achieved by holding a hypothetical put option 
with the desired terms. The trades associated with dynamic 
hedging are on the same side as the direction of the .market, 
that is, selling when indices are falling, and buying when 
indices are rising. They thus tend to be destabilising and 
can contribute to higher market volatility. 
Miller (1992) analyses the financial innovations of the 
previous two decades. In a section entitled "The Case 
Against the Innovations" he discusses the major criticisms 
levelled at the introduction of futures and options. 
Tpe new financial instruments have been blamed for lowering 
transaction costs and leading to too much short-term trading 
which wastes resources and reduces the planning horizons of 
firms and investors. While acknowledging that trading 
volumes have increased, Miller disputes the belief that 
financial innovations are the major cause. He also argues 
that increased trading does not necessarily mean more waste 
from society's point of view. 
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In recent years, stock market volatility has been rising and 
share index futures have been held responsible. The evidence 
fails to support the perception of rising volatility. 
Volatility has not risen substantially during the last few 
decades, except around major crashes like that of October 
1987. The tendency of volatility to rise after crashes and 
fall during booms has been a well researched and documented 
property of volatility series. The lack of evidence, to 
support the belief that volatility has been rising, suggests 
that the public may be using market crashes themselves as 
their definition of volatility. In order to assess whether 
or not the suspicions are true, given this definition, one 
needs to establish whether or not index futures and options 
were responsible crashes like that of October 1987. 
The two most criticised applications of futures and options 
are portfolio insurance and index arbitrage. The former has 
been found to have been a contributing factor, but not of 
having caused the crash. Certain futures hedging strategies 
can lead to destabilisation of the market by concealing 
bearish views and creating arbitrage opportunities. Index 
arbitrage is generally regarded as being neutral in its 
impact on the market. The downward pressure in one market, 
caused by selling, is normally balanced by equal buying 
pressure in the other. 
There are circumstances which could lead to an increase in 
volatility. Studies have found that prices are moved by news 
and not by speculative noise coming from the futures markets. 
The relatively low cost of futures trading makes it an easy 
entry point for any new information about the economy. If 
the news is significant enough to push prices through the 
arbitrage limits, then it will carry from the futures market 
to the cash market. Arbitrage is nevertheless the medium and 
not the message. 
Stoll and Whaley (1997) respond to accusations of 
destabilisation by stating that investigations have shown 
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consistently that that index futures do not destabilise the 
underlying stock markets. Index futures have been found 
rather to increase liquidity and efficiency. 
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There are thus conflicting views on the effects of index 
futures trading on the volatility of the underlying assets. 
There are arguments to support both views that futures 
trading has a stabilising and a destabilising effect on 
underlying assets prices. Proponents of the destabilisation 
view have imposed regulations on futures markets in an 
attempt to control the effects on the underlying assets. 
Their detractors argue that the very measures they have 
imposed do more harm than good. The actual effect of futures 
trading is an empirical issue which has been investigated in 
the papers in the following section. 
2.4 Empirical research: The impact of futures trading on the 
volatility of the underlying assets 
Early research on the effect of futures trading on cash 
markets focuses on commodity futures markets (Cox, 1976; 
Danthine, 1978). Futures trading on interest-bearing 
securities and foreign currencies began in the early eighties 
(Figlewski, 1981). Index futures and options were introduced 
in the United States in 1982 and 1983 (Harris, 1989). 
Cox (1976) investigates the effect of organised futures 
trading on information in the underlying spot markets. He 
studies the price effects of futures trading for onions, 
potatoes, pork bellies, hogs, cattle and frozen concentrated 
orange juice (FCOJ). For each commodity he compared the 
price behaviour in a period with no futures trading to the 
price behaviour in a period in which there was formal futures 
trading. 
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He concludes that: 
1. Futures trading in a commodity increased the quantity of 
the traders' information. 
18 
2. A spot market is more efficient when there is futures 
trading in the sense that prices reflect available market 
information more fully. 
3. The behaviour of prices does not support the claim that 
producers and consumers are harmed by price effects of 
futures trading. 
The empirical evidence on price behaviour shows an 
information effect of futures trading. Market prices provide 
more accurate signals for resource allocation when there is 
futures trading in the commodity. The price effects result 
mainly from more fully informed traders. 
The results are inconsistent with the view that futures 
trading destabilises spot prices in a way that is harmful to 
traders in the physical commodity. This has implications for 
regulatory policy because it contradicts the arguments 
supporting the prohibition of certain futures trading and 
regulation of futures in other commodities. The data does 
not support the claim that price effects impose costs on 
consumers and producers. Spot markets seem to work more 
efficiently because of futures trading and its prohibition 
reduces market efficiency. 
Figlewski (1981) draws a conflicting conclusion on the effect 
of futures trading on the volatility of the underlying 
assets. He finds that price volatility in the GNMA cash 
market was related to several factors. Increased liquidity 
and lower average prices tended to stabilise the market while 
futures market activity increased the volatility of prices. 
He finds no evidence of insufficient speculative activity in 
futures relative to hedging and ruled out the likelihood of 
price manipulation because of extensive safeguards against 
it. He holds that futures prices are set largely by the 
actions of a new class of traders with a lower quality of 
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information than the GNMA dealers who set the cash prices. 
When the additional noise in the futures market is 
transmitted to the cash market then volatility increases. He 
speculates that the effect of information differences may 
diminish as the futures traders gain more experience, but 
they are unlikely ever to have as complete information as the 
cash market dealers. 
Figlewski argues that while the increased volatility may be 
undesirable, the futures market has extended the 
possibilities for hedging and risk management to a much wider 
investor population. 
These papers examine the effects of futures trading on 
commodity and financial asset markets. Edwards (1988) 
extends the research to share index futures. He examines the 
volatility of the NYSE before and after the start of index 
futures trading. He finds no evidence that futures trading 
has caused long-run destabilisation of the stock market. 
Volatility appears to have dropped since the introduction of 
index futures trading. 
Harris (1989) compares the cash price volatilities before and 
after the introduction derivative trading. He also performs 
a cross-sectional analysis comparing the volatility of the 
underlying assets to that of similar assets for which there 
is no derivative trade. He compares the volatility of a 
sample of S&PSOO shares to that of a sample of non-S&PSOO 
shares. 
The results show an increase in the volatility of the S&PSOO 
shares relative to the non-S&PSOO shares. The increase 
started becoming significant in 1985 and is largest in 
volatilities measured from short return intervals. Harris 
found the differences to be statistically significant but 
probably too small to be of economic significance. He 
suggests that the increase could however be attributable to 
other factors. 
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Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) examine whether greater 
futures trading activity, volume and open interest, is 
associated with greater equity volatility. They find that 
equity volatility is negatively related to anticipated 
futures trading volume and anticipated open interest. This 
suggests that active futures markets lead to a decrease and 
not an increase in the volatility of the underlying equity 
market. This is consistent with theories (e.g. Grossman, 
1988a) which predict that futures trading increases the 
liquidity and depth of the underlying asset market. 
The study also investigates the hypothesis, originally 
suggested by Samuelson in 1965, that price volatility 
increases as the futures contract maturity date approaches. 
Futures trading activity varies throughout the contract 
period with systematic increases in the volume and the open 
interest towards the end of the contract period. 
Bessembinder and Seguin found that equity volatility is 
slightly higher on the expiration date but that it is not 
related to the futures cycle as a whole. 
The study found a positive relationship between equity 
volatility and contemporaneous trading volumes in the spot 
equity and equity futures markets. The results were not 
considered to be definitive as the effect of environmental 
changes was not controlled for, nor could they study the 
behaviour of the market in the absence of futures trading . 
20 
They found no support for the theory that futures trading 
leads to price destabilisation of the equity markets. This 
is consistent with the theories of Grossman (1988b), Grossman 
and Miller (1988) and the findings of Edwards (1988). 
A study of share volatility after the introduction of index 
futures on the JSE (Vanden Baviere and De Villiers, 1997) 
found no statistically significant increasing trend in the 
volatility of the index constituents relative to that of non-
constituents. 
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Vanden Baviere and De Villiers finding, that the introduction 
of index futures trading did not increase the volatility of 
the index constituents, is consistent with the findings in 
the United States of Edwards (1988) and Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1992). Vanden Baviere and De Villiers' study 
investigates whether or not the volatility of the ALSI 
constituents has increased over the period from January 1988 
to December 1994. The study does not attempt to f~nd any 
link between futures trading activity and the volatility of 
the JSE. 
The empirical evidence on the impact of index futures trading 
on the volatility of the underlying assets is therefore 
inconclusive. The conflicting results of certain studies 
(Figlewski, 1981; Edwards 1988), inconclusive results 
(Harris, 1989) and the conflicting theories (e.g. Forsythe, 
Palfrey and Plott, 1984) indicate that the discussion and 
speculation on the issue is by no means over. 
2.5 The nature of ~iquidity 
While the concept of liquidity is well understood, it is not 
a readily measurable prop~rty of assets (Grossman and Miller, 
1988; De · Villiers, 1996). 
Grossman and Miller (1988) set out to develop a model of 
- J • 
market ~tructure that explains the nature of market 
liquidity. Li~uidity is determined by the supply and demand 
. . -
of immediacy~ Immediacy is the abili~y to trade without 
- delay as ··soon as on~ party to a tra~sa~tion has decided to 
. 
dispose of, or ' purchase an asset. The demand~or immediacy 
is affected by the volatility of the price of the asset and ' 
. 
the ease with which the price' ~isk can be diversified. The 
supply of immediacy is provided by market makers and is 
determined by the costs to the market maker of supplying the 
. . 
liquidity. The~ . include the " di~ect costs of carrying out the 
transaction and the opportunity cost associ~ted ~ith 
maintain~ng a level of liquidi ty -sufficient to a l low the 
market makers to remain open f or . bus i ness. 
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Grossman and Miller criticise the traditional bid-ask spread 
as a measure of liquidity. They state that the bid-ask 
spread is only an exact measure of the market maker's return 
for providing immediacy when the market maker simultaneously 
I 
executes both sides of a trade, the ~ne at the bid price, and 
the other at the ask pric~. In this situation the market 
maker only incurs the cost of carrying out the transaction as 
no liquidity service is provided. The spread does not 
therefore measure the cost of the supply of immediacy. 
A large volume of transactions occur within the limits of the 
bid-ask spread. Individual traders may decide not to buy or 
sell at the quoted prices so that the quoted bid-ask spread 
is not an accurate reflection of the underlying market. 
A third problem with the bid-ask spread measure exists when 
there is a delay between the orders to buy and sell. During 
this period the market makers are exposed to the risk of 
informationless trading. The spread will therefore include a 
component to compensate them for potential losses to more 
informed traders. 
The authors also discuss the limitations of the ,liquidity 
ratio as a measure of market liquidity. The ratio is defined 
as the ratio of the average volume of trading to the average 
price change during a period of time. If the ratio is high 
then a high volume of trading leads to a small price change 
and a low value means that a low volume could induce a large 
price change. The ratio does not explain how an unusually 
large order would affect the price. It also does not 
differentiate between the many causes of volatility 
sufficiently. A market may be volatile because it is 
illiquid but still informationally efficient. Even when 
volumes of trading are low, price volatility can be high 
where the information is unambiguous. 
The measurement of liquidity using the bid-ask spread is 
often complicated by a lack of available data. Roll (1984) 
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derives an implicit measure of the bid-ask spread from a time 
series of market prices. The bid-ask spread, regarded by 
Roll as a trading cost, is a measure of the liquidity of. an 
asset. The method requires two major assumptions. The asset 
--
must be traded in an informationally efficient market and the 
probability distribution of the price changes must be 
stationary. The f~rmula derived to measure the bid-ask 
spread is Spread= 2.J- cov, where "cov" is the first-order 
serial. covariance of the price changes. 
The effect of liquidity on the value of an asset is examined 
by Arnihud and Mendelson (1986) who study the effect on share 
-pricing. They explain that the bid-ask spread is a measure 
of the difference between the asking and selling price of an 
asset. The asking price contains a premium for immediate 
delivery of the asset and the selling (bid) price contains a 
discount for immediate sale. The bid-ask spread is the price 
that the market maker or dealer charges for bridging the gap 
between the buy and sell orders. The dealer provides 
liquidity and allows for immediate execution of the deal . 
. 
The authors observ:e that studies i.ndicate that the bid-ask 
spread as a pe~centage of the share price has a strong 
negative correlation with attributes that are indicators of 
liquidity. lhese include trading volume, the number o~ 
shareholders, the number of dealers in the share and the 
continuity of the price (lack of volatility). 
If investors value shares on their returns net of trading 
costs then they will require a hl.gher rate of return from 
those shares with higher bid-ask ~preads. The liquidity of a 
share will therefore have an impact on its price. The 
investors' intended holding period of a share will also 
affect the price of share as a result of the bid-ask spread. 
The bid-ask spread is a cost at the purchase and selling 
dates. This cost is amortised over the holding period of the 
inve~tment. Investors would prefer a longer holder period 
for high spread shares~ Long t~rm investors may therefore 
price shares differently to short term investors as the 
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amortisation periods of the transaction costs will differ. 
As an increase in liquidity will lead to an increase in 
value, improvements to trading mechanisms which could improve 
liquidity may lead to substantial economic benefits. 
Bradfield, Barr and Affleck-Graves (1988) invel~igate the 
pricing of shares on the JSE using the Capital Asset Pr~cing 
Model (CAPM). They also study other effects on pricing, 
namely dividend yield, size and liquidity. They set out to 
determine the extent to which the liquidity of an asset 
affects its pricing structure. 
While the conce~t of liquidity is well understood, the 
measurement thereof is fraught with difficulty and a number 
of different measures have been used. Most of the measure~ 
of liquidity involve using ratios of price changes to tr~ding 
volume changes. The problem with these methods is that they 
also measure changes resulting .from the arrival of new 
information which biases the results. The bid-ask spread has 
been suggested as a suitable measure of liquidity. As 
accurate records of bid-ask spreads were not available for 
the JSE, the authors use Roll's proposed method of 
calculating the spread which is discussed above. They· are 
unable to find a significant relationship between the 
calculated spreads and the returns on the market. 
De Villiers (1996) cites a JSE report which found that 
"liquidity on the JSE is unsatisfactorily low". The report 
of the research subcommittee on the future structure of the 
JSE defined liquidity as "annual turnover expressed as a 
percentage of market capitalisation". 
De Villiers takes issue with this definition and suggests 
that low turnover and liquidity, although often associated, 
are not synonymous. Liquidity is regarded as the ease with 
which assets may be traded. Although turnover and liquidity 
are related, other factors affecting liquidity include 
information disclosure, market trading procedures and costs. 
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Ignoring these other factors rules out measures to increase 
liquidity without necessarily increasing market turnover. 
Liquidity is desirable and investors will pay a premium for 
it. Liquidity lowers the required rate of ~eturn, reduces 
the cost of capital and increases real investment in the 
economy. 
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Liquidity is difficult to measure because it is a combination 
of a number of measurable properties. The ability to trade 
quickly and at a small discount are two elements of 
liquidity. Volume also plays a role as the price of a share 
traded at the same speed but with a larger volume may have a 
lower price. Similarly, a share sold at the same speed but a 
higher volume may be traded at a discount. 
De Villiers concludes that none of the definitions of 
liquidity capture all its dimensions. Nevertheless, it is 
still an important property of shares which plays a role in 
the determination of value. 
He found that the significance of liquidity has been 
quantified to some extent. Studies have shown that shares 
trade at discounts of up to 50% because of liquidity 
constraints. The findings illustrate the benefits to society 
of secondary markets where the reduced cost of capital to 
firms increases the amount of real investment in the economy. 
De Villiers discusses a number of different measures that 
have been used to measure liquidity. The most commonly used 
measure is the bid-ask spread. Where bid and asked prices 
are not recorded, proxies for the bid-ask spread have been 
calculated. One of these, developed by Roll, and discussed 
above, was used by Bradfield, Barr and Affleck-Graves 
(1988) (see above). They did however express their concern at 
the accuracy of the measure. De Villiers notes that Karp 
(1994) found positive serial co-variances in his data and 
could not use the measure in his study. 
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The volatility ratio is the ratio of short term to long term 
volatility. It focuses on the price dimension of liquidity. 
The rationale for this measure is that illiquidity would 
increase the volatility of short term returns but have a 
lesser effect on long term returns. As the times at which 
transactions occur on the JSE are not recorded, collecting 
intra-day data to calculate the short-term volatility in the 
ratio is not practical. 
The volume of trade is also used as a measure of liquidity. 
This measure has been criticised as it does not provide an 
indication of the sensitivity of the price to volume. As has 
been mentioned above, trading volume may indicate liquidity 
but the terms are not synonymous. An increase in volume, all 
else being equal, does however improve the tractability and 
thus the liquidity of an asset. 
The liquidity ratio attempts to measure the relationship 
between the price and volume measures of liquidity. It is 
calculated by dividing the average daily volume of trade by 
average value of daily percentage price changes over the same 
period. A high value means that many shares were traded with 
a small change in price, and therefore that the asset is 
easily traded and liquid. It could also be regarded as the 
volume of trade required to move the price up or down by one 
percent. The liquidity ratio has been criticised as high 
volatility could result from frequent arrivals of new 
information without large trading volumes. This would 
nevertheless lead to a low ratio which might not indicate 
illiquidity. 
The price elasticity could describe the relationship between 
the price and volume dimensions of liquidity. This measure is 
not commonly used as it has estimation problems and it does 
not consider the time dimension of liquidity. 
The time to optimum disposal measure describes the 
relationship between the price and time dimensions of 
liquidity. The measure assumes that a trader uses the 
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optimum search and wait policy and then uses the time it 
takes to execute the sale as a measure of liquidity. If it 
is optimal for the trader to trade quickly then the asset is 
easily tradable and thus liquid. If it is optimal for the 
trader to wait a long time before trading, then the asset is 
considered to be illiquid. Although the ' measure has merit in 
theory, it has not been used in empirical studies. The 
estimation of the time to disposal from available data would 
be difficult. 
De Villiers discusses some potential methods to improve 
liquidity. These are classified into methods to increase the 
volume of trade, improve the flow of information about shares 
to investors and changes to the trading system. The lowering 
of transaction costs like marketable securities tax, the 
lowering or removal of income taxes on share profits and the 
relaxation of exchange controls are examples of ways to 
increase volumes. Some analysts believe that the development 
of derivative markets will encourage trading in the 
underlying assets and thus increase liquidity. 
The papers show the problems associated with the measurement 
of liquidity. It is nevertheless a desirable quality of 
financial assets and thus influences their value. Measures 
to improve liquidity will increase value. 
2.6 A theoretical perspective of the impact of futures 
trading on the liquidity of the underlying assets 
Edwards (1988) suggests that futures trading should bring 
more traders to the cash market, making the cash markets more 
liquid and, therefore, less volatile. 
Grossman and Miller (1988) discuss the crash of October 1987 
in terms of their model of market liquidity. The crash was a 
huge liquidity event. with an imbalance in the demand and 
supply of immediacy. Both the cash spot and futures markets 
were flooded with huge sell orders . . Each behaved according 
to its own market structure. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
28 
On the NYSE opening on individual shares can be delayed in 
order to give market makers the opportunity to balance 
orders. The S&P500 futures market, on the other hand, is 
designed to enable prices to adjust to news as soon as 
possible. In terms of their model the high demand for 
immediacy in the futures market, to hedge price risk in the 
spot market, means that the futures markets are geared to 
provide this immediacy. In the spot market, the lower costs 
of delayed execution mean that the market makers provide more 
of a search service than immediacy. 
The delayed opening of trading in many shares on the NYSE on 
19 October 1987 led to large price drops before trading had 
resumed in most shares by 11h00. The two markets were then 
working almost in concert before they became ·highly illiquid 
and unable to supply immediacy at the normal cost. The early 
gap between the spot and futures markets contributed to the 
belief that futures trading had dragged down the spot prices 
by signalling that heavy selling was on its way. 
Grossman and Miller argue that restrictions imposed on 
programme trading broke the arbitrage link between the market 
makers in spot and futures markets. Arbitrageurs, who take 
offsetting positions in both markets, at almost the same 
time, can transfer some of the order imbalances from the 
first affected market to the other. The market makers 
resources can be used more effectively to reduce the trading 
costs in both markets. They therefore find it ironic that 
arbitrage programme trading is blamed for undermining 
investor confidence in the market. 
Grossman (1988a) takes a broad view of the relationship 
between the futures and cash markets. He proposes that 
market makers in futures markets combine with market makers 
in the spot markets to enhance the overall liquidity of the 
equity market. Bessembinder and Seguin's (1992) findings 
support the theory of increased market liquidity. 
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The theoretical arguments support the hypothesis that index 
futures trading increases liquidity in the underlying cash 
market. The empirical work in the literature has focused on 
the effects on volatility of index futures trading. In many 
cases (Grossman, 1988a; Edwards 1988; Bessernbinder and 
Seguin, 1992) higher liquidity associated with lower 
volatility was found to result from index futures trading. 
This paper seeks to test this hypothesis empirically for the 
JSE. 
2.7 Conclusion 
A relationship between liquidity and volatility is evident 
from the studies. The literature deals with both concepts 
which together affect the value of financial assets. 
Volatility is found to be related to a number of different 
factors and is a rational response to new information 
available to investors. This finding supports the efficient 
markets hypothesis and attempts to reduce volatility by 
regulating trading will reduce efficiency in the market and 
lead to even higher levels of volatility. 
Most of the authors (e.g. Danthine, 1978; Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott, 1984, Edwards 1988; Grossman, 1988b; Miller, 1992) 
argue from a theoretical viewpoint that the introduction of 
index futures trading should reduce volatility in the 
underlying assets. There are some circumstances (Figlewski, 
1991; Miller 1992) when the opposite effect could occur. 
The empirical evidence on the impact of index futures trading 
on the volatility of the underlying assets is inconclusive. 
There are conflicting results in some of the studies 
(Figlewski, 1981; Edwards 1988), inconclusive results 
(Harris, 1989) and opposing views (Forsythe, Palfrey and 
Plott, 1984). 
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Further investigation on the effects of index futures trading 
on the JSE is therefore needed in order to provide additional 
evidence on the matter. The empirical analysis in this study 
covers the period from 1990 to 1997 and investigates the 
relationship between the volume and value of index futures 
trading for the three main share indices and the volatility 
of the underlying assets on the JSE. 
While the concept of liquidity is well understood, it is not 
a readily measurable property of assets (Grossman and Miller, 
1988; De Villiers, 1996). The papers show the problems 
associated with the measurement of liquidity (e.g. De 
Villiers, 1996). It is nevertheless a desirable quality of 
financial assets and thus influences their value. Measures 
to improve liquidity will increase value (De Villiers, 1996) . 
The theoretical arguments put forward in the literature 
support the hypothesis that index futures trading increases 
liquidity in the underlying cash market. Empirical work has 
tended to focus on the effects on volatility of index futures 
trading where higher liquidity, associated with lower 
volatility, was found to result from index futures trading 
(Grossman, 1988b; Edwards 1988; Bessembinder and Seguin, 
1992). This paper seeks to test this hypothesis empirically 
for the JSE. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review reveals that the empirical evidence on 
the impact of index futures trading on the volatility of the 
underlying assets is inconclusive. 
The first objective of this study is to investigate further 
the effects of index futures trading on the volatility of 
JSE. The following empirical analysis, of the period from 
1990 to 1997, investigates the relationship between the 
volume and value of index futures trading for the three main 
share indices and the volatility of the underlying assets on 
the JSE. 
The theoretical arguments in the literature review add weight 
to the hypothesis that index futures trading increases 
liquidity in the underlying asset market. The second 
objective of this paper is to test this hypothesis for the 
JSE. 
3.2 The impact of index futures trading on the volatility of 
the JSE 
The impact of index futures trading on the volatility of the 
underlying assets on the Johannesburg Stock exchange is 
assessed by using linear regression. A measure of the 
volatility of the underlying assets is determined first. The 
impact of index futures trading is then assessed with 
reference to the volume and value of index futures trading. 
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3.2.1 The measurement of the volatility of the underlying 
assets 
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Volatility has been measured using a number of different 
formulae (Figlewski, 1981; Grossman, 1_988b; Edwards 1988; 
Schwert, 1989; Ederington and Lee, 1993; Lee, Ready and 
Seguin, 1994; Stoll and Hunt, 1996; Vanden Baviere and De 
Villiers, 1997). The standard deviation of daily log returns 
used by Ederington and Lee (1993), Stoll and Hunt (1996), and 
Vanden Baviere and De Villiers (1997) has been used in this 
study. The measure is widely used and fairly simple to 
calculate. In addition, it does not require more information -
than is available on the JSE. 
The log return is calculated using the formula: 
Rt = l_( ~) where: 
1\Pt-I 
Rt the log return in period t 
Pt the closing price at the end of period t 
P~1 the opening price at the start of period t 
For the purposes of this study the price referred to is the 
index level. 
The time series being investigated is the price of the 
underlying assets, the shares, on the JSE. The ALSI, ALSI40, 
INDI, INDI25, GLDI and GLDI10 indices have been used as 
proxies for the aggregated prices of all the underlying 
assets. In this analysis, volatility is measured by 
calculating the standard deviation of the daily log returns 
for each month from May 1990 to June 1997. 
There are 86 observations which form the sample of the 
population of monthly volatility measures of the prices of 
the underlying assets, the shares, on the JSE. 
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3.2.2 The volume and value of index futures trading 
Contracts are currently closed out on the third Friday, or 
previous business day, of March, June, September and 
December. Prior to the June 1997 contracts, the expiry dates 
were the 15th of March, June, September and December or the 
next business day. The expiry date is due to change again in 
1998 to the last Thursday of the same months or the previous 
business day. 
Each contract is identified by its index, its expiry date and 
its term, which is a multiple of three months, i.e. three, 
six, nine, twelve, fifteen, eighteen, twenty-one and in some 
cases even twenty-four months. 
At any point in time only one contract per index of each term 
can be traded. There may however be contracts of different 
terms trading simultaneously. The larger trading volumes 
normally occur in the near (three month) contracts while 
trading in middle (six month) and far (nine months and over) 
contracts is usually lower. There were certain periods 
covered by the study during which this did not apply and the 
trading volumes on all contracts were therefore aggregated 
for each day in order to arrive at the total daily volumes. 
The daily volumes were then aggregated for each of the 86 
months covered by the study. The number of trading days in 
each month varies with the number of days in the month and 
the number of national holidays. The total volume for each 
calendar month was therefore divided by the number of trading 
days in order to determine the average total volume traded 
per trading day for each month. 
There are 86 observations which form the sample of the 
population of monthly volumes of futures contracts trading 
for each of the indices. 
The total daily trading values, being the volumes multiplied 
by the ruling futures price at the time of the deals, was 
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also accumulated in the same way. The regression analyses 
have been performed using both volumes and values traded in 
the futures market. 
34 
The 86 observations were used for the ALSI. There was no 
recorded trade in GLDI and INDI futures during October, 
November and the first 14 days of December in 1992. These 
three months were therefore excluded from the sample leaving 
83 observations. 
The indices on which the futures are based were changed from 
the ALSI, GLDI and INDI to the ALSI40, GLDIO, and INDI25 from 
15 March 1996. The spot indices were changed half way 
through the month and the differences between the levels on 
and after 15 March 1996 are large enough to distort the 
calculated volatility. The observations for this month have 
therefore also been excluded. The number of observations was 
thus reduced to 85 for the ALSI and 82 for the GLDI and the 
INDI futures. As the actual values of the indices are not 
relevant to this analysis, no further adjustment has been 
made for the change in the index base. 
3.2.3 Regression method: Spot price volatility and the volume 
of index futures trading 
The analysis has been performed by regressing the volatility · 
of the underlying assets, calculated as described above, with 
the total volume of trade in the related futures, as 
calculated above: 
where 
crt Standard deviation of returns in month t 
fvolt = Average daily futures volume in month t 
c = Regression constant 
B = Coefficient of the dependent variable 
Et = Random error term 
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If the slope of the regression line (B) is not significantly 
different from zero then this means that the independent ~ 
variable is not a significant explanatory variable for the 
dependent variable. 
The hypothesis test is as follows: 
Null (H0 ) : The volume of index futures 
trading is not a significant 
explanatory variable for the 
volatility of the underlying 
asset market. (B = 0) 
Alternative (H1 ): The volume of index futures trading 
is a significant explanatory variable 
for the volatility of the underlying 
asset market. (B * 0) 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the regression coefficient 
(B) is significantly different from zero. All the regression 
results have been considered using the t-statistics for B and 
c at a 95% confidence level. 
Serial correlation has been tested for all the regressions 
using the Durbin-Watson d-statistic. The results have been 
evaluated using the tabulated upper and lower bounds for the 
number of observations and one independent variable. 
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3.2.4 Regression method: Spot price volatility and the value 
of index futures trading 
The analysis has also been performed by regressing the 
volatility of the underlying assets, calculated as described 
above, with the total value traded in the related futures, as 
calculated above: 
where 
crt Standard deviation of returns in month t 
fvalt = Average daily futures value in month t 
c = Regression constant 
B Coefficient of the dependent variable 
Et = Random error term 
The hypothesis test is as follows: 
Null (Ho) : The value of index futures trading 
Alternative (H1 ): 
is not a significant explanatory for 
the volatility of the underlying asset 
market. (B = 0) 
The value of index futures trading 
is a significant explanatory variable 
for the volatility of the underlying 
asset market. (B * 0) 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the regression coefficient 
(B) is significantly different from zero. 
3.3 The impact of index futures trading on the liquidity of 
the JSE 
The impact of index futures trading on the liquidity of the 
underlying assets on the JSE is assessed by using regression 
techniques. 
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Two measures of the liquidity of the underlying assets are 
selected first. The impact of index futures trading is then 
assessed with reference to the volume and value of index 
futures trading. 
3.3.1 The measurement of the liquidity of the underlying 
assets 
The liquidity has been measured using both the liquidity 
ratio and volume of trade in the spot market. 
The liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing the average 
daily volume of trade in the spot market during a time period 
by the average value of the daily percentage price change 
over the same period (De Villiers, 1996). In this case, 
weekly data was used so the formula for each week (t) is as 
follows: 
Liquidity Ratiot 
Average daily volume of trade (spot)t 
= Average daily% price change (spot)t 
Weekly trading volumes for the constituents of the ALSI40 
were only available as far back as October 1995. Weekly 
trading volumes for the constituents of the INDI25 and the 
GLDI10 were available from June 1995. 
The liquidity ratios have been calculated on a weekly basis 
for these periods as follows. The absolute values of the 
daily percentage price changes were calculated. These were 
then totalled for each week and divided by the number of 
trading days for the week in order to determine the average 
daily percentage price changes of the underlying assets. 
The volume of trading was also totalled for each week and 
divided by the number of trading days in order to determine 
the average daily trading volume of the underlying assets. 
The liquidity ratios were then calculated for each week using 
the formula above. 
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The ALSI observations cover the period from 2 October 1995 to 
11 July 1997, a total of 94 weeks. There were five weeks 
during the period for which no data was available so the 
final sample consists of 89 observations. 
The GLDI and INDI observations cover the period from 19 June 
1995 to 11 July 1997, a total of 109 weeks. There were five 
weeks during the period for which no data was available so 
the final sample consists of 104 observations. 
3.3.3 The volume and value of trade in the spot market 
As was the case for the volatility analysis, the volume of 
futures trading on all contracts were aggregated for each day 
in order to arrive at the total daily volumes. 
The daily volumes were then aggregated for each of the weeks 
covered by the study. As the number of trading days in each 
week can vary, the total volume for each week was divided by 
the number of trading days in order to determine the average 
daily volume for each week. The average daily value of 
futures traded for each week was calculated in the same way. 
3.3.4 Regression Method: Spot volume and the volume of index 
futures trading 
The analysis has been performed by regressing the liquidity 
of the underlying assets, calculated as described above, on 
the volume of trade in the related futures, as calculated 
above: 
St c + B fvolt + ft 
where 
St = Average daily spot volume in week t 
fvolt = Average daily futures volume in week t 
c Regression constant 
B Coefficient of the dependent variable 
Et Random error term 
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The hypothesis test is as follows: 
Null (Ho) The volume of index futures 
trading is not a significant 
explanatory variable for the liquidity 
of the underlying asset market. (B = 0) 
Alternative (H1 ) : The volume of index futures trading is 
a significant explanatory variable for 
the liquidity of the underlying asset 
market. 
(B *- 0) 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the regression coefficient 
(B) is significantly different from zero. 
3.3.7 Regression Method: Liquidity ratio and the value of 
index futures trading 
The analysis has been performed by regressing the liquidity 
of the underlying assets, calculated as described above, with 
the value of trade in the related futures, as calculated 
above: 
c + B fvalt + Et 
where 
lratt = Average daily spot volume in week t 
fvalt = Average daily futures value traded in week t 
c = Regression constant 
B Coefficient of the dependent variable 
Et Random error term 
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The hypothesis test is as follows: 
Null (Ho) 
Alternative (H1 ) : 
The volume of index futures 
trading is not a significant 
explanatory variable for the liquidity 
of the underlying asset market. (B = 0) 
The volume of index futures trading is 
a significant explanatory variable for 
the liquidity of the underlying asset 
market. 
(B * 0) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DATA USED IN THE STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
There are a number of time series used in the empirical 
analyses in the next chapter. This chapter describes the 
data to used for the empirical analyses. 
4.2 The time series used in the study 
This study deals with the following time series: 
43 
Daily index levels (as surrogates for the price levels in the 
spot market) 
• All Share Index Level (ALSI) and ALSI40 Level 
• Industrial Index Level (INDI) and INDI25 Level 
• All Gold Index Level (GLDI) and GLDilO Level 
Daily value of futures traded on the SAFEX share index 
futures market 
• ALSI and ALSI40 value of futures traded 
• INDI and INDI25 value of futures traded 
• GLDI and GLDilO value of futures traded 
Daily volumes of futures traded (number of contracts traded) 
on the SAFEX share index futures market 
• ALSI and ALSI40 volumes of futures traded 
• INDI and INDI25 volumes of futures traded 
• GLDI and GLDilO volumes of futures traded 
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Weekly volumes traded (no of shares) in the constituents of 
the indices (as surrogates for the volumes traded in the spot 
market) 
• ALSI40 constituent volumes 
• INDI25 constituent volumes 
• GLDI10 constituent volumes 
In addition to these, other time series are derived from the 
above as required. These are measures of volatility and 
liquidity as calculated in the previous chapter. 
4.3 The index levels 
The closing index levels were available on a daily basis. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange calculates the share indices 
on a weighted average basis according to the following 
formula (Levett, 1991): 
INDEXt = izl 
where 
INDEXt Value of the index at time t 
Pit Price per share of constituent i at time t 
n = Number of constituents in the index 
wit Number of eligible shares for constituent i at t 
k = Constant chosen to base the index to a value at the 
starting date of the index. 
The All Share, All Gold and Industrial indices are based on a 
selection of shares with the largest market capitalisation 
which make up approximately 80% of the sector capitalisation. 
Since 1995 the ALSI40, INDI25 and GLDilO indices have also 
been calculated. These indices are calculated in a similar 
manner but are based on the top forty, twenty-five and ten 
shares respectively on·a market capitalisation basis. 
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The ALSI, GLDI and INDI levels have been used as surrogates 
for price of the underlying assets in the market until 15 
March 1996 when the SAFEX futures started trading on the 
ALSI40, INDI25 and GLDI10 indices. There was a small gap 
between the two sets of indices at this date and this has 
been dealt with in the empirical analyses. 
Graphical representations of the index levels are shown 
below: 
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The graph indicates the fluctuations in the ALSI over the 
seven year period. 
index. 
There is a general upward trend in the 
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All Gold Index/GLDilO Level 
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There is a gap in the chart from 1 October to 14 December 
1992. During this period there was no recorded trading in 
GLDI futures. As the index data was linked to the futures 
trading data, no daily index levels were available for this 
period. The index does not show a similar growth trend to 
that of the ALSI. 
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Industrial Index/INDI25 Level 
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There is a gap in the data, as for the INDI, for the period 
from 1 October 1992 to 15 December 1992. Overall there is a 
strong upward trend in the index over the period. 
4.4 Volumes traded in the constituents of the indices 
Volumes (number of shares traded) are recorded on a daily 
basis for the constituents of each index on the JSE. For 
this study, weekly volumes were used for the ALSI40, INDI25 
and GLDI10. 
The volumes are calculated as follows: 
n 
SVOLt = L vit 
i=l 
where 
SVOLt Volume of shares traded in index for week t 
Vit Volume of shares traded for constituent i for week t 
n = Number of constituents in the index 
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Graphs of the volumes traded appear below: 
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The data was available for the two-year period from October 
1995 to September 1997. There is a steady upward trend in 
trading volumes over the two year period. 
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The data for the GLDI10 and the INDI25 was available from 
July 1995 to September 1997. 
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Both graphs show an upward trend in the volume of shares 
traded on the JSE. 
4.5 Daily value of futures traded 
49 
The value of each future traded is determined by multiplying 
the index level by RlO (SAFEX, 1997). In order to calculate 
the daily value of futures traded for each index, the total 
value of each contract traded must be aggregated. 
At any point in time there could theoretically be up to eight 
contracts trading on any one index (three, six, nine, twelve, 
fifteen, eighteen, twenty-one and twenty-four month 
contracts). The total values for each of these contracts 
also need to be aggregated. 
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The formula is as follows: 
n 
FVALt = L vit 
i=l 
where 
FVALt = Value of futures traded in the index for day t 
v 1t = Value of futures traded for contract i for day t 
n = Number of contract periods traded in the index on 
day t (i.e. three, six, twelve months, etc) 
The resultant value is a product of the number of contracts 
traded (the volume) and the value of the underlying index. 
This value has been used as a measure of the trading on the 
SAFEX. 
50 
The value of futures traded on the SAFEX is shown graphically 
below. 
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The large increase in the value of ALSI/ALSI40 futures 
trading over the seven year period is evident from the graph. 
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Value of futures traded on the GLDI/GLDilO 
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There is a gap in the data from 1 October 1992 to 15December 
1992 as explained above. The daily value of contracts traded 
was relatively low until mid-February 1993 when the trend 
begins a climb to a peak in September 1994. This is followed 
by a steady downward trend to July 1997. The graph shows a 
similar pattern to that of the underlying index level. As 
the value is a product of the index and the number of 
contracts traded, this trend is at least partly as a result 
of the fluctuations in the index level. 
was evident for the ALSI contracts. 
A similar pattern 
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There is again a gap in the data from 1 October 1992 to 15 
December 1992. The graph shows a steady growth in value 
traded. The upward trend in the index level will have 
contributed to the growth. 
4.6 Daily volume (no. of contracts) of futures traded 
52 
The volume is the total number of contracts for all futures 
trading on a particular index for the day. This is also used 
as a measure of the trading on the SAFEX. It is not affected 
by the value of underlying index. 
The formula is as follows: 
n 
FVOLt = L vit 
1=1 
where 
FVOLt = Volume of futures traded in the index for day t 
v 1t Volume of futures traded for contract i for day t 
n Number of contract periods traded in the index on 
day t (i.e. three, six, twelve months, etc.) 
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Graphs of the volume of futures trading appear below. 
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As expected, this graph shows a similar pattern to that of 
the futures values traded. The peaks and troughs are not 
magnified by the level of the underlying index. The increase 
in the volume over the period under review is clearly 
evident. 
Number of GLDI/GLDilO contracts traded 
14000 
12000 
10000 
Ul 
... 8000 v 
"' ... 
I--CONTRACTS I 
.., 
c 6000 
0 
u 
4000 
2000 
0 
0 0 0 .... .... .... N N N C"'l C"'l C"'l .., .., .., Ill Ill Ill ID \D \D r- r-
0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' N 
.., r- Ill Q) 0\ r- .., ID .... Q) Q) .... C"'l .., Q) r- N \D .., r- ID ID 
0 N .... .... 0 N N N .... .... 0 N N N .... 0 0 0 N N .... .... .... 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Ill Q) N .., Q) .... C"'l r- .... C"'l r- 0 N ID 0 N ID 0 .... Ill 0\ .... Ill 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0 0 
Date 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
54 
The graph shows the contrast between the low volumes traded 
before October 1992 and the relatively high volumes from 
March 1994. Although the trend is not as marked as that in 
the graph of the trading values, there has been a steady 
decrease in the volume of gold futures traded from March 1992 
to July 1997. 
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A steady increase in the volume of INDI contracts is evident 
from the graph. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS OF THE EMPRICAL RESEARCH 
5.1 Introduction 
The results of the regressions are listed below for each 
index. The tables of regression results contain the number 
of observations (Obs), the regression coefficient (Beta), the 
regression constant (c), the coefficient of variation (r2 ), 
and the Durbin-Watson d-statistic. The relevant t-statistics 
for B and c are listed in brackets below each result at a 95% 
confidence level. 
Results where B is not significantly different from 0 (at the 
95% confidence level) are marked with a *. This notation has 
been used as, more often than not, the results were 
significant. Where d indicates that the possibility of 
serial correlation cannot be rejected, it is marked with a + 
Where the Durbin-Watson test is inconclusive it is marked 
with a ~ 
5.2 The impact of index futures trading on the volatility of 
the JSE 
5.2.1 Results: The volume of index futures trading 
The results of regressing the volatility of the underlying 
assets on the volume of futures trading are as follows: 
Index Obs Beta Constant rL d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 85 -8.68575E-08 0.009131421 0.006178 1.76321 
(-0.718306). (11. 070802) 
GLDI 82 2.10109E-06 0.017488444 0.143953 1.03027+ 
(3.6678147) (13.211059) 
INDI 82 4.82168E-07 0.006386071 0.104848 1. 77778 
(3.0610968) (11.215249) 
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From the samples, the volume of futures trading is a 
significant explanatory variable for the volatility of the 
underlying assets for the GLDI and the INDI but not for the 
ALSI. 
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It is interesting to note that the B for the ALSI is 
negative. The magnitude of the slope is however very small 
and the B is also not significant at the 95% level. The ALSI 
represents the entire market which includes those shares 
represented by the GLDI and the INDI. There are however a 
number of other sectors, like the financial sector, which are 
not represented by the GLDI and the INDI. It is therefore 
not inexplicable that the ALSI should show a different 
behaviour to the other two indices. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is significant for GLDI which 
means that serial correlation has reduced the efficiency of 
the regression but this will not bias the estimates of the 
slope and intercept terms (Copeland & Weston, 1992). 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the ALSI. The 
null hypothesis is rejected for the GLDI and the INDI. The 
alternative (H1 ) is accepted that the volume of index futures 
trading is a significant explanatory variable for the 
volatility of the underlying asset market for these two 
indices. There is a thus a significant positive relationship 
between the volume of index futures trading and the 
volatility of the underlying assets for the GLDI and the 
INDI. 
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5.2.2 Results: The value of index futures trading 
The following table contains the results of the regression of 
the volatility of the underlying assets on the value of 
futures trading: 
Index Obs Beta Constant r L d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 85 -2.05518E-12 0.009265 0.013642 1.782739 
-1.0714205. 12.319816 
GLDI 82 7.1685E-11 0.0188613 0.102761 1. 0205 62 
3.02694983 16.281253 
INDI 82 5.76403E-12 0.0066077 0.097289 1.787106 
2.93630788 12.513212 
The results are very similar to those of the previous 
regressions. The value of futures trading is a significant 
explanatory variable for the volatility of the underlying 
assets for the GLDI and the INDI but not for the ALSI. The d 
statistic is again significant for the GLDI, indicating the 
problem of serial correlation. 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the ALSI. The 
null hypothesis is rejected for the GLDI and the INDI. The 
alternative (H1 ) is accepted that the value of index futures 
trading is a significant explanatory variable for the 
volatility of the underlying asset market for these two 
indices. 
As for the volume of futures trading, there is a significant 
positive relationship between the value of index futures 
trading and the volatility of the underlying assets for the 
GLDI and the INDI. 
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5.3 The impact of index futures trading on the liquidity of 
the JSE 
5.3.1 Results: The volume of trading on the JSE and the 
volume of trade in futures contracts 
The volume of trade in the underlying assets is used as a 
measure of liquidity. The results of the regression of the 
underlying assets volume on the futures volume are as 
follows: 
Index Obs Beta Constant rL d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 89 429.5437545 5898404.397 0.1981022 1. 989271 
(4.6360149) (7.0592235) 
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GLDI 104 725.1166447 1518296.342 0.3028332 1.545482<1> 
(6.6563095) (6.2266111) 
INDI 104 635.7067212 3590746.225 0.1588852 1.599192<1> 
(4.3894909) (4.1893097) 
From the samples, the volume of futures trading is a 
significant explanatory variable for the liquidity of the 
underlying assets for all of the indices. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic is inconclusive for the GLDI and the INDI. 
The null hypothesis is thus rejected for all three indices. 
There is thus a significant positive relationship between the 
volume of futures trading and the liquidity of the underlying 
assets as measured by the volume of trading. 
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5.3.2 Results: The volume of trading on the JSE and the 
value of trade in futures contracts 
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The results of the regression of spot volumes on the value of 
futures traded are listed below: 
Index Obs Beta Constant r " d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 89 6.282491063 5993861.683 0.189205253 2.0018317 
(4.505788047) (7 .162772774) 
GLDI 104 6.08055616 442625.9552 0.189324356 1. 4015744+ 
(4. 880673626) (9.834278857) 
INDI 104 8.419370286 3429454.315 0.18024986 1. 6651135 
( 4. 735837628) (4.735837628) 
From the samples, the value of futures trading is a 
significant explanatory variable for the liquidity of the 
underlying assets for all of the indices. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic is significant for the GLDI. 
As for the previous regression, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for all three indices. There is a significant 
positive relationship between the value of futures trading 
and the liquidity of the underlying assets as measured by the 
volume of trade in the index constituents. 
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5.3.3. Results: The liquidity ratios of the underlying assets 
the volume of trade in futures contracts 
The results of the regression of spot liquidity ratios on the 
volume of futures traded are listed below: 
Index Obs Beta Constant r~ d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 89 262.9743023 15745302.8 0.0098627 1. 62626778 
(0.9309157)' (6.1806338) 
GLDI 104 0.354666257 4 67 631.2321 0.0007116 2.23276506 
(0.2695000)' (9.8358446) 
INDI 104 -420.349669 16337206.66 0.0063791 1.89017707 
(-0.809226)* (5. 3141940) 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all three indices. 
There is thus no significant relationship between the volume 
of futures trading and the liquidity of the underlying assets 
as measured using the liquidity ratio. 
5.3.4. Results: The liquidity ratios of the underlying assets 
the value of trade in futures contracts 
The results of the regression of spot liquidity ratios on the 
value of futures traded are as follows: 
Index Obs Beta Constant rL d 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
ALSI 89 4.459600772 15476176.42 0.0126636 1.6379733 
(1.056345)* (6.1081379) 
GLDI 104 0.354666257 467631.2321 0.0007116 2.2327651 
(0.269500)* (9.8358446) 
INDI 104 -3.79075551 15677778.59 0.0033553 1. 8858041 
(-0.58600)' (5.1687184) 
The results are similar to those of the previous regression. 
Once again the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all 
three indices. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
5.4.1 Tests of the effect on the volatility of the underlying 
assets 
The results of the regression tests are summarised as 
follows: 
Index Independent Variable Significant relationship with 
underlying asset volatility 
ALSI Futures volumes No 
GLDI Futures volumes Yes 
INDI Futures volumes Yes 
ALSI Futures value traded No 
GLDI Futures value traded Yes 
INDI Futures value traded Yes 
5.4.2 Discussion of the results 
The empirical analysis in the study covers the period from 
1990 to 1997 and investigates the relationship between the 
volume and value of index futures trading for the three main 
indices and the volatility of the underlying assets on the 
JSE. 
The results of the regression tests indicate significant 
positive relationships between futures trading activity and 
the volatility of the underlying assets for the All Gold 
Index and the Industrial Index. This indicates that 
increased futures trading is associated with increased 
volatility in the underlying assets. The relationships were 
not significant for the All Share Index. 
The results support the hypothesis that index futures trading 
increases the volatility of the underlying assets. 
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5.4.3 Tests on the effect of the liquidity of the underlying 
assets 
The following tables summarise the results of the regression 
tests of the impact of index futures trading on the liquidity 
of the underlying assets. 
Dependent variable: Volume of trade in the underlying assets 
Index Independent Variable Significant relationship with 
underlying asset liquidity 
ALSI Futures volumes Yes 
GLDI Futures volumes Yes 
INDI Futures volumes Yes 
ALSI Futures value traded Yes 
GLDI Futures value traded Yes 
INDI Futures value traded Yes 
Dependent variable: Liquidity ratios 
Index Independent Variable Significant relationship with 
underlying asset liquidity 
ALSI Futures volumes No 
GLDI Futures volumes No 
INDI Futures volumes No 
ALSI Futures value traded No 
GLDI Futures value traded No 
INDI Futures value traded No 
5.4.4 Discussion of the results 
The regression tests, using the volume of trade in the 
constituents of the indices as a measure of the liquidity of 
the underlying assets, indicate significant relationships 
with both the volume and value of rela ted futures trading for 
all three indices. The results indicate a significant 
positive relationship between the level of futures trading 
activity and the liquidity of the cash market. 
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Using the liquidity ratio as a measure of the liquidity of 
the underlying assets did not result in any significant 
relationships between the liquidity of the underlying assets 
and the level of futures trading. 
The conflicting results emphasise the problems with the 
measurement of liquidity. Where, however, there is an 
increase in volume, all else being equal, this will improve 
the tractability and thus the liquidity of an asset (De 
Villiers, 1992). The findings thus support the hypothesis 
that index futures trading is associated with greater 
liquidity in the underlying assets. 
63 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
64 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
High levels of volatility lead to uncertainty and increase 
the risk associated with investments in the market. Measures 
to reduce volatility without affecting expected returns will 
increase the value of assets. Low levels of liquidity mean 
that shares are not readily traded. This increases the risk 
associated with the shares as investors are unsure of a ready 
market for their investments. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate what effect index 
futures trading has had on the liquidity and volatility of 
the underlying asset market on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. 
6.2 The impact of index futures trading on the volatility of 
the underlying assets on the JSE 
The findings in the literature support the efficient markets 
hypothesis and the volatility of share prices is found to be 
a rational response to information by investors. Regulatory 
measures to reduce volatility by imposing trading halts 
result in reduced efficiency in the market and even higher 
levels of volatility. 
There are conflicting views in the literature on the effects 
of index futures trading on the volatility of the underlying 
assets (Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott, 1984). The empirical 
evidence in the literature is inconclusive and includes 
conflicting results (Figlewski, 1981; Edwards 1988). 
Most of the authors (e.g. Danthine, 1978; Forsythe, Palfrey 
and Plott, 1984, Edwards 1988; Grossman, 1988b; Miller, 1992) 
argue from a theoretical viewpoint that the introduction of 
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index futures trading should reduce volatility in the 
underlying assets. There are some circumstances (Figlewski, 
1991; Miller 1992) when the opposite effect could occur. 
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The empirical analysis of the period from 1990 to 1997 
investigates the relationship between the volume and value of 
index futures trading for the All Share Index, All Gold Index 
and the Industrial Index and the volatility of the underlying 
assets on the JSE. 
The regression test results show a significant positive 
relationship between futures trading activity and the 
volatility of the underlying assets for the All Gold Index 
and the Industrial Index. Increased futures trading is thus 
associated with increased volatility in the underlying 
assets. The relationships were not significant for the All 
Share Index. 
The results support the hypothesis th t index futures trading 
increases the volatility of the underlying assets. 
6.3 The impact of index futures trading on the liquidity of 
the underlying assets on the JSE 
While the concept of liquidity is well understood, it is not 
a readily measurable property of assets (Grossman and Miller, 
1988; De Villiers, 1996) . The literature indicates the 
problems associated with the measurement of liquidity. It is 
nevertheless a desirable quality of financial assets and thus 
influences their value. Attempts to improve liquidity will 
increase value. 
The theoretical arguments support the hypothesis that index 
futures trading increases liquidity in the underlying cash 
market. The empirical work in the literature has focused on 
the effects on volatility of index futures trading. In many 
cases (Grossman, 1988b; Edwards 1988; Bessembinder and 
Seguin, 1992) higher liquidity associated with lower 
volatility was found to result from index futures trading. 
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The first set of regression tests used the volume of trade in 
the constituents of the indices as a measure of the liquidity 
of the underlying assets. The results indicate significant 
relationships with both the volume and value of related 
futures trading for all three indices. There is a 
significant positive relationship between the level of 
futures trading activity and the liquidity of the cash 
market. 
The second set of regression tests used the liquidity ratio 
as a measure of the liquidity of the underlying assets. The 
results did not indicate any significant relationships 
between the liquidity of the underlying assets and the level 
of futures trading. 
These conflicting results highlight the problem associated 
with the measurement of liquidity. An increase in volume, 
all else being equal, does however improve the tractability 
and thus the liquidity of an asset (De Villiers, 1992). The 
results therefore support the hypothesis that index futures 
trading is associated with greater liquidity in the 
underlying assets. 
6.4 Scope for further research 
The measurement of liquidity is identified as being 
problematic. Further research into establishing suitable 
measures of the tractability of assets is required. The 
results of such research may open the way to more 
investigation of ways to improve liquidity. 
Further research of the relationship between the JSE and the 
SAFEX would be useful. Short-run versus long-run volatility 
tests and their relationship with SAFEX trading levels could 
improve our understanding of the link between the two 
markets. At present a lack of availability of intra-day data 
on both markets imposes restrictions on this research. 
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The introduction of commodity futures trading on the SAFEX 
has opened opportunities for further research into the 
effects on the underlying assets. 
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